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We develop a political economy model of trade agreements following along the line of
Grossman and Helpman (1995a) yet incorporating contracting costs, uncertainty and
multiple policy instruments. We show that rent-seeking eﬀorts do not aﬀect tariﬀ
rates as they are oﬀset by the substitution eﬀect of domestic production subsidies.
Similar to Horn et al (2010), we ﬁnd the coexistence of uncertainty and contracting
costs make optimal trade agreements incomplete contracts. Our model helps explain
diﬀerential treatment on subsidies, countervailing duties, and the national treatment
principle - all key provisions of the current WTO agreement.
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11. Introduction
The divergence of trade policy from trade theory has justiﬁably drawn signiﬁcant
attention. Trade agreements have never been easy to negotiate (e.g. WTO Doha
round) nor have they always been eﬀectively enforced. Economists have provided
frameworks/models that explain the structure of optimal trade agreements under
somewhat restrictive assumptions. Two diﬀerent avenues are prominent in the litera-
ture. The ﬁrst approach takes trade agreements as incomplete contracts and utilizes
contract theory (Copeland 1990, Battigalli and Maggi 2003, Horn 2006, Horn et al
2010). Along this avenue, Horn et al (2010) were the ﬁrst to endogenously include
the set of policy instruments thereby modeling trade agreements as endogenously in-
complete contracts. They assume that production and consumption externalities, as
opposed to rent-seeking behavior, are the rationale for policy intervention.1
The second approach considers rent-seeking behavior as the rationale for policy
intervention. Putman (1988) utilizes a two-level game where at the national level,
domestic interest groups compete while governments attempt to construct coalitions
amongst those groups. At the international level, governments seek to maximize their
own ability to satisfy domestic rent-seeking pressures while minimizing the adverse
consequences from foreign counterparts. Grossman and Helpman(1995b) incorpo-
rated the two levels into one sequential game and derived the necessary conditions
for a free trade agreement to be an equilibrium outcome. Along this vein, Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare’s (1998, 2007) ﬁnd that the optimal agreement that stipulates dis-
cretionary tariﬀs below the upper bound is identical to an incomplete contract which
fails to specify the future contributions of a lobby. However, as they noted, their
model does not capture other important factors such as uncertainty and contracting
costs.
In general, the incomplete contract approach does not consider rent-seeking pres-
sures as an incentive for trade agreements while the political economy literature has
not considered essential elements of contracting incompleteness such as uncertainty
and contracting costs. We attempt to develop a model which allows for rent-seeking
pressures while accounting for uncertainty and contracting costs.2 We follow Gross-
man and Helpman (1995a) by assuming that each lobby sets contribution schedules to
maximize total net payoﬀ of its members; and the incumbent government maximizes
an expected weighted sum of aggregate social welfare and total political contributions
received from the lobbies.3 Accounting for uncertainty during the lifetime of the trade
1Horn et al (2010) explored a political economy version of their model as well but utilized a
reduced form for the politician’s objective function and assumed that governments place a greater
weight on producer surplus. However, as Grossman and Helpman (1994) noted in their paper, a re-
duced form would catch the eﬀects of institutional changes on a government’s willingness and ability
to protect particular interest groups but not on the government’s weighting of political contributions
relative to national welfare.
2A clear example of the excessive contract costs was the WTO agreement itself which took
approximately 8 years of negotiation and contains 24,000 pages of clauses. It has been argued that
many of the negotiators, particularly in developing countries where resources may be limited, are
very unclear about what they are negotiating.
3Others have chosen diﬀerent government objective functions. For example, Limï¿œo and Pana-
2agreement, we follow an approach similar to Battigalli and Maggi (2002) by assuming
that contracting costs are increasing in the number of state variables and policies
included in the agreement. Working within a competitive two-country setting, we
characterize the choice of contract form endogenously. We ﬁnd that if there is no
contracting cost, it is in the best interest of both countries to impose trade policies
that are equivalent to free trade. We derive three results consistent with Horn et
al (2010) but within a political economy context: (i) it is not optimal to contract
over domestic subsidies while leaving tariﬀs to discretion; (ii) it is optimal to leave
subsidies to discretion if countries trade little or the substitutability between tariﬀs
and domestic production subsidies is limited; and (iii) it is optimal to leave National
Treatment (NT) based consumption taxes to discretion if countries trade little or the
substitutability between tariﬀs and domestic consumption taxes is limited.
In the following section, we develop our political economy model and ﬁnd the
optimal trade and domestic production policies resulting from both a noncooperative
equilibrium and a costless trade agreement. Section III extends the model by account-
ing for uncertainty and contracting cost. Section IV further extends the model by
characterizing the optimal NT-based trade agreement. Our conclusions are outlined
in section V.
2. A Political Economy Model of Production Subsidies and Trade Policies
We consider trade between two countries (Home, Foreign) and denote Foreign by *.
We assume that there is a numeraire good 0 which is not subject to any policy inter-
ventions and n other nonnumeraire goods in each country. Prior to policy intervention
some of these n goods are imported while others may be exported. A representative
individual of Home maximizes the following utility:




where c0 is the consumption of numeraire good 0 and ci is the consumption of good
i. The sub-utility functions ui() are assumed diﬀerentiable, increasing and strictly
concave. We let qi denote the domestic consumer price of good i in Home, and di(qi)
denote the representative individual’s demand for good i, which is the inverse of u0
i().
Their indirect utility is given by
v(q;e) = e + S(q);
where e is the total spending, and q = (q1;q2;:::;qn) is the vector of domestic con-




i qidi(qi) is the
consumer surplus associated with these goods.
The numeraire good 0 is produced using only labor, has constant returns to scale,
and an input-output ratio of 1. We assume that the aggregate labor supply is large
gariya (2007) assumes the governments objective function weights social welfare as well as inequality
not political contributions.
3enough to maintain positive production of this good. The competitive wage is nor-
malized to 1. Each of the other goods is produced from labor and an industry-speciﬁc
input. Letting pi represent domestic producer price, the aggregate proﬁt accruing to
the speciﬁc factor used in industry i, denoted by i(pi), is an increasing function of pi.
The aggregate supply of good i is the slope of the proﬁt function (X(pi) = 0
i(pi) > 0
for i = 1;2;:::;n:)
In this section we assume that each government can intervene in any of its non-
numeraire sectors using a speciﬁc tariﬀ/export subsidy and a speciﬁc domestic pro-
duction subsidy/tax.4 We denote an ad valorem tariﬀ or export subsidy for industry
i by i and thus
qi = i!i; (1)
where !i represents the world price. If i > 1 it represents the tariﬀ on an import
good or the export subsidy on an export good. Conversely, if i < 1 it represents an
import subsidy or an export tax. We introduce a domestic production subsidy/tax
for industry i and denote by si. The pricing relationship between the Home producer
price and the Home consumer price can be expressed as
pi = qi + si: (2)
Net imports of good i in Home are Mi = Ndi(qi)   Xi(pi), where N is the total
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) = 0; i = 1;2;:::;n: (3)
Equation (3) allows us to solve for !i, the world market clearing price of good i, as a
function of i, 
i , si and s
i. We denote this functional relationship by !i(i;
i ;si;s
i).
The vector of trade policies  = (1;2;:::;n), the vector of domestic production
subsidy policies s = (s1;s2;:::;sn), and market clearing prices ! = (!1;!2;:::;!n)








A representative individual obtains income from wages, possible claims (proﬁts)
to one of the industry-speciﬁc inputs, as well as government transfers. Individuals are
assumed to own at most one type of claims to the industry-speciﬁc inputs (e.g. claims
to industry-speciﬁc human capital). Changes in i and/or si aﬀect an individual’s
utility through both changes in consumer prices and claims. However, an individual
holding a claim in industry j will be primarily aﬀected from j and sj through their
claim j.
The owners of the speciﬁc factor used in industry i, with their common interest
4We introduce consumption taxes as a policy instrument in section IV when analyzing the eﬀect
of an NT clause.
4in protection or subsidies for that industry, may choose to create a lobby or join an
existing lobby in an attempt to inﬂuence government policy. However, not all owners
of speciﬁc factors succeed in organizing politically (free rider problems, transaction
costs, etc.) and thus some industries have no means to eﬀectively inﬂuence policy.
The set of industries, denoted by L, where speciﬁc factor owners are organized is
assumed exogenous. Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) we assume that lobby
groups express their policy demands by means of political contribution schedules.
Each lobby group represents a certain industry i and sets contribution schedules
Ci(;s;) to maximize the joint welfare of its members.5 Note that we have omitted
arguments that represent Foreign policies thus allowing us to distinguish the case of
a noncooperative equilibrium (where the contribution schedule depends only on the
policies of the Home government), from that of cooperative equilibrium (where the
contributions may also depend on policies implemented by the Foreign government).
The objective of lobby group i can be expressed as
Vi = Wi(;s;!)   Ci(;s;);
where
Wi(;s;!)  li + i(pi) + i[R(;s;!) + S(!)]
is its gross joint welfare. Note i is the fraction of the voting population that owns
the speciﬁc factor used in industry i, and li is the joint labor income of these factor
owners.
We assume that governments maximize their political welfare which is equal to the
weighted sum of the welfare of its representative voter and total political contributions




Ci(;s;) + aW(;s;!); a  0
where a reﬂects the government’s weighting of aggregate social welfare relative to
political contributions. Note W represents the aggregate social welfare which is given
by
W(;s;!)  l +
X
i
i(pi) + R(;s;!) + S(!);
where l is the aggregate labor income.
The sequence of actions by the various political forces in the two-level game are as
follows. First, various lobbies in each country simultaneously and noncooperatively
set contribution schedules that make the amount of political contributions contingent
on possible policy outcomes. Each lobby takes as given the contribution schedules
of all other lobbies at home and abroad. Second, both governments weigh net gains
from acting cooperatively versus noncooperatively. In either case, the contribution
schedules in one country are unobservable to the other. At this stage, costs of coop-
eration – drafting and negotiating a detailed trade agreement – which we refer to as
5Those industries which do not organize have Ci(;s;) = 0.
5contracting costs, become important. We allow the relative weight of aggregate social
welfare (a), the fraction of population in industry i (i), and the volume of import
demand in a certain industry (Mi) to change during the lifetime of the agreement.6
In addition some industries may create or dissolve a lobby during the lifetime of the
agreement. An implicit assumption throughout is that trade agreements are perfectly
enforceable. The two governments set their trade policies and domestic production
policies either cooperatively or noncooperatively depending on the net gains from
each.
The Noncooperative Equilibrium
We derive the policy choices which occur in the absence of a trade agreement (i.e., a
noncooperative equilibrium). Taking Foreign government’s policies (;s) as given,
Home government’s noncooperative policy vectors satisfy the following two conditions:
(
0;s










The ﬁrst condition states that Home government selects the policy vectors that max-
imize their own interest, given the contribution schedules oﬀered by the domestic
lobby groups and subject to the policy choices of Foreign government. The second
condition stipulates that the equilibrium policy vectors must maximize the joint wel-
fare of the government and each lobby i, taking the contribution schedules of all other
lobbies as given. If this is not the case, lobby i could alter its contribution schedule
to induce the government to choose the jointly optimal policy vectors and capture
the majority of the surplus from the policy switch (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
Letting P 0 = (0;s0) and P 0 = (0;s0) and assume that contribution schedules
are diﬀerentiable around the equilibrium point. The ﬁrst order conditions of equations

























) = 0 foralli 2 L:
(7)







) foralli 2 L; (8)
which stipulates a property of the equilibrium contribution schedules known as local
truthfulness (Grossman and Helpman, 1994)7.
6Technological and consumer taste changes can aﬀect the level of net import demand (Mi) and the
number of employees remaining in a certain industry. Political circumstances can change signiﬁcantly
through time as diﬀerent political parties may come into government, particularly in developing
countries. Nordhaus (1975) noted the implicit weighting function on consumption has positive
weight during the electoral period and zero (or small) weights in the future.
7Local truthfulness is such that each lobby i sets its contribution schedule so that the marginal
change in the contribution for a small change in Home policy matches the marginal change in the







) = 0: (9)
This equation gives the equilibrium Home policy choices conditional on Foreign policy
vector P . The equilibrium Home policy vectors maximize the weighted sum of
aggregate social welfare and the lobbies’ gross joint welfare. Similarly, we can obtain









0;P) = 0: (10)
We characterize the noncooperative equilibrium policy vectors by substituting P 0
for P  in equation (9) and P 0 for P in equation (10) and treating these as a system





































i !i2+1)g = 0:
(12)
where IiL is an indicator variable that equals 1 if industry i is represented by a lobby
and 0 otherwise, and L 
P
i2L i is the fraction of voters who are represented by
lobbies.































































i is the elasticity of Foreign export supply or import demand
(corresponding to M
i is negative or positive) in industry i. Equation (13) deﬁnes the
noncooperative choice of i given domestic production policy si and Foreign policies
(s
i and 
i ). The three terms on the right-hand side of equation (13) represent the
political support motive, terms-of-trade motive, and substitutability of domestic pro-
duction subsidies for trade policies respectively. The ﬁrst two components consist of
the expression for noncooperative trade policies in Grossman and Helpman (1995a).
lobby’s gross welfare brought by the change in Home policy.
7Thus, the noncooperative equilibrium trade policies deﬁned by Grossman and Help-
man (1995a) is a special case when the government cannot implement production
policies (s0
i  0). Equation (13) also shows that the substitutability of si is limited if
the industry has low price sensitivity of supply (X0
i is small) or high price sensitivity
of import demand (jM0
ij is large). Equation (14) deﬁnes the noncooperative choice of
si given Home trade policy i and Foreign policies (s
i and 
i ).
Solving equations (13) and (14) yields Home’s noncooperative policies

0















where i  piX0
i=Xi is the elasticity of supply in industry i in Home8. Not surpris-
ingly, equation (15) illustrates that Home exploits any international markets power by
exerting a tariﬀ (or export tax) at the same level as Johnson’s optimal tariﬀ rate (the
inverse of elasticity of Foreign export supply or import demand). This is because the
political support motive and the production subsidy term counter each other. This ob-
servation suggests a possible cross-country prediction for uses of tariﬀ policies. That
is, developed countries which may be more capable of funding a domestic production
subsidy as a substitute for a tariﬀ may be less likely to exert high levels of tariﬀs in
comparison to developing countries. Equation (16) reﬂects that, in a noncooperative
equilibrium, the optimal production policies for each country is to tax industries not
represented by lobbies while subsidizing domestic production in industries represented
by lobbies. Note, as the fraction of voters represented by lobbies goes down, the rate
of the production subsidy in politically organized industries increases while the rate
of the production tax in politically unorganized industries decreases. The intuition
is that as the number of members in lobbies decreases, the lump sum lobbies receive
from government transfers also decreases and therefore account for a smaller fraction
of the gross joint welfare. In turn, lobbies care less about the government transfer
from production taxes on politically unorganized industries, but have more incentive
to seek economic rents resulting from production subsidies. At the extreme case when
population in lobbies constitutes a negligible fraction of the voters (L = 0), the rate
of the production subsidies in organized industries would be the highest, while no in-
dustry would be taxed, all else equal. Another observation is that as the government
places less weight on aggregate social welfare relative to political contributions, the
rate of production subsidy/tax (jsij=pi) will increase.
The Costless Trade Agreement
Assuming there is no contracting costs, global eﬃciency requires the two governments



















8This result is consistent with Schleich and Orden (1996).
8Note, the weight of each country’s aggregate social welfare are equalized (to aa) while
the relative weights of aggregate social welfare and political contributions within each
country are identical to that of the noncooperative case9.
Following the same derivations as the noncooperative case, we can show that the










































Hence, the equilibrium policy combinations maximize the Global Policy Preference
function (





















Given the market clearing price in equation (3), we can establish that equations (17)
and (18) are linearly dependent. As a result, only the relative values of P and P  can
be recovered.
It is convenient to begin with the case in which factor owners represented by lobby
groups comprise a negligible fraction of the voters in each country, i.e., aL = a
L = 0.















































































Equation (19) deﬁnes the ratio of the two countries’ cooperative trade policies given
their respective production policies. In contrast to equation (13), the terms-of-trade
motives of both countries (1=e
i and 1=ei ) are removed because of cooperation. Note
if we let si  s


















Grossman and Helpman (1995a). Therefore, the ﬁndings in Grossman and Helpman
(1995a) again serve as a special case when policy instruments are restricted to joint
trade policies. Equation (20) deﬁnes the ratio of the two countries’ cooperative pro-
9This function of global welfare follows Grossman and Helpman (1995a). Further research would
consider alternative forms such as using diﬀerent Nash weights reﬂecting relative bargaining abilities
of the two governments.




























i = 0: (23)
We can extend the analysis to the more general case. When aL > 0 and a
L > 0,



























i is the elasticity of supply in industry i in Foreign.10
Comparing equation (24) with equation (16), we ﬁnd that the expression for the
noncooperative and globally eﬃcient levels of s are the same. For a given state of the
world, that is, ﬁxing IiL, L, a, i, the rate of production subsidy/tax (jsij=pi) is the
same in both cases and thus global ineﬃciency can not be caused by domestic pro-
duction policies. Consequently, an agreement that only constrains s cannot increase
global welfare relative to the noncooperative equilibrium and thus is not an optimal
agreement. On the other hand, equation (23) stipulates that the tariﬀ rate in Home
is equal to the export subsidy in Foreign in a costless trade agreement. In this case,
domestic and world prices will remain the same as in free trade. This ﬁnding conﬁrms
that a costless trade agreement removes ineﬃciency resulting from trade policies and
thus provides some rationale for WTO’s countervailing duty law.
3. The Optimal Trade Agreement
Before characterizing the optimal agreement we need to introduce two important
assumptions. First, there are four sources of uncertainty during the lifetime of the
agreement that may lead to an incomplete contract: the relative weight of aggregate
social welfare (a and a); the fraction of population that is represented by lobbies
(L and 
L); whether an industry may organize or dissolve its political lobby (IiL
and I
iL), and the level of import demand (Mi and M
i ). Second, we assume that
10Replace a, a , IiL and I
iL with a + 
L, a + L, IiL   L and I
iL   
L in equations (19) and
(20) and follow the process as the derivation of equation (21).
10there are two categories of contracting costs: state variables (e.g. a, L; IiL, Mi
and their Foreign counterparts); and policy variables (e.g.  and s and their Foreign
counterparts). Following Battigalli and Maggi (2002), we assume that contracting
costs are increasing in the number of state variables and policies included in the






where np and ns are the number of policy and state variables in the agreement re-
spectively.
The optimal agreement maximizes expected 
 less contracting costs, deﬁned as























which imposes the ﬁrst-best policies derived in last section has np = 4 and ns = 6 and
therefore costs c(4;6) and yields Net Global Policy Preference equal to E(
0) c(4;6).
It’s easy to verify that if contracting costs are negligible, A0 is the optimal trade
agreement. At the other extreme, if contracting costs are prohibitively high then the
noncooperative equilibrium occurs. The interesting case is where contracting costs
matter but do not prohibit a trade agreement.
We have previously shown that the ineﬃciency in the noncooperative equilibrium
results from , not s, and thus an optimal trade agreement should at least impose con-
straints on . The question remaining is whether the agreement should also constrain
s?
Recall equation (14) solves
P
i2L rsWi(P 0;P )+arsW(P 0;P ) = 0 and gives the
expression for sN(;P ), the noncooperative choice of s if  and  are constrained






















































The eﬃcient choice of s given  and P , denoted by sE(;P ), solves rs
 = 0, and
the eﬃcient choice of s given  and P, denoted by sE(;P), solves rs
 = 0.
Whether a trade agreement which binds  should also constrain s depends on the
magnitude of the gain in expected GP implied by replacing sN(;) with sE(;). If
the expected gain is less than the contracting cost incurred by negotiating on s, then it
is better to exclude s from the trade agreement. Assuming that sN(;P ) > sE(;P )
and sN(;P) > sE(;P) for a given state of the world, the gain of constraining s




















(sE(;P );sE(;P);;) = rs
(sE(;P );sE(;P);;) = 0 and
it is assumed that 
 is concave in s and s; a suﬃcient condition for the right-
hand side in equation (28) to be small is that jrs
(sN(;P );sN(;P);;)j and
jrs
(sN(;P );sN(;P);;)j are small. Given
P
i2L rsWi(sN(;P );;P ) +


































Due to the possible state of the world and henceforth the ambiguity of the sign of the
term of Mi  (
i  1)!i
i jd0
i j it is diﬃcult to assess the eﬀect of trade volume (jMij).
Nonetheless, with some realistic assumptions, we are able to shed light on circum-
stances under which it is desirable to exclude s and s from the trade agreement.
Suppose Home is the net importer in industry i and Foreign imposes an export
subsidy not too high (in fact GATT/WTO prohibits export subsidies so (
i  1)  0)
or exerts an export tax, then the term Mi   (
i   1)!i
i jd0
i j is positive, which we















Similarly, if Home exerts a tariﬀ, or assuming an eﬀective constraint on import subsidy












i j + (i   1)!iijd
0
ij]: (30)
Looking closer at equations (29) and (30), there are three circumstances under which
the beneﬁts of restricting s and s are suﬃciently small that they may not oﬀset the
accompanying contracting costs and thus should be omitted from the trade agreement.
First, Bi (B
i ) will be small if Mi (jM
i |) is suﬃciently small. This is the case
when Home (Foreign) has too little trade volume to manipulate the terms of trade.




























ij is the level of Johnson’s optimal tariﬀ and is referred to as monopoly power
eﬀect in Horn et al (2010). We conclude the monopoly power eﬀect can be decomposed into trade
volume eﬀect and price sensitivity of import demand.
12Second, Bi (B
i ) will be small if X0
i (X0
i ) is suﬃciently small. This indicates low
price sensitivity of supply which is a condition where a domestic production subsidy
is a poor substitute for a tariﬀ. Note, the domestic production subsidy only distorts
the producer margin whereas a tariﬀ distorts both the producer and the consumer
margins. These two ﬁndings are consistent with those in Horn et al (2010). Third,
Bi (B
i ) will be small if jM0
ij (jM0
i j) is suﬃciently large. This indicates high price
sensitivity of import demand in Home (export supply in Foreign), also a condition
where a production subsidy is a poor substitute for a tariﬀ.
The above analysis may help to explain a noteworthy change from GATT to
WTO. The use of subsidies, largely unconstrained in GATT, are disciplined by the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). One
possible explanation is that trade volumes have increased signiﬁcantly over time thus
raising the potential gains from removing distortions caused by domestic production
subsidies. Our model also suggests diﬀerential treatment, across countries, with re-
spect to production subsidies. Countries whose volume of imports are small, and
whose market conditions limit the substitution of production subsidies for tariﬀs (e.g.
developing countries), are more likely to beneﬁt from a trade agreement that does
not constrain production subsidies. Not surprisingly, the SCI agreement oﬀers those
countries preferential treatment with respect to subsidies.
4. The Optimal Trade Agreement Based on National Treatment Principle
We have assumed that consumption taxes are negligible in the two countries, however,
they are an important policy instrument. National Treatment (NT), which stipulates
equal consumption taxes on domestically produced and imported goods, is a basic
principle of GATT/WTO. Assessing the eﬀect of the NT principle requires a broader
class of trade agreements which take into account consumption taxes.
Suppose without the NT provision, each country can implement an internal tax
on the consumption of the domestically produced goods and an internal tax on the
consumption of the imported goods, respectively, th and tf. In this setting, pricing
relationships can be expressed as












pi = i!i + t
f










!i + (si   t
h
i ): (32)
Note that equations (31) and (32) are laid out such that the term i + t
f
i =!i behaves
like i and the term si   th
i behaves like si when no consumption taxes are present.









































13has np = 8 and ns = 6 and therefore costs c(8;6).




i = ti: So these relationships become
qi = i!i + ti; (33)
pi = i!i + si: (34)
Not surprisingly, the consumption tax does not aﬀect the relationship between the
world and producer prices but does aﬀect the relationship between world and con-
sumer prices. Therefore, while it is possible to reduce the wedge between producer
and world prices (by reducing  and s) and leave consumption taxes to discretion in
a NT-based agreement, this is not true in the absence of the NT principle.
The question to be answered is under what circumstances is it desirable to include

























where NT represents the NT principle and is equivalent to using four policy instru-
ments (th=tf and th = tf), has np = 10 and ns = 6 and therefore costs c(10;6). The
NT-based agreement A2 can get the same GP as non-NT agreement A1, but costs
























A3 saves on contracting costs as a result of excluding policy variables t and t but
may result in a reduction of gains from the agreement because of possible distortions
caused by not constraining t and t.
Again, we can denote the noncooperative choice of t conditional on t, P and P as
tnc(t;P;P ) and the eﬃcient level of t conditional on t, P and P as tE(t;P;P ).
The gain in GP implied by substituting tE(t;P;P ) and tE(t;P;P ) for tnc(t;P;P )
and tnc(t;P;P ) then is the extra gain of constraining consumption taxes in an NT-



















Following steps similar to those in last section, we observe that a suﬃcient condition
for this gain in GP to be small is that jrt
(tN(t;P;P );tN(t;P;P );P;P j and
jrt


































If Home is the net importer in industry i, as equation (36) indicates, Zi is small
when jdi
0j is suﬃciently small, meaning low price sensitivity of demand12, or when
jMi
0j is suﬃciently large, meaning high price sensitivity of import demand. In either
case, t is a poor substitute for , and the beneﬁts of including t in the NT-based
agreement may be too small to oﬀset accompanying contracting costs and thus it is
optimal to exclude t from the NT-based trade agreement.








i]+aMi is ambiguous and therefore it is diﬃcult to determine
the trade volume (Mi) eﬀect. However, if we assume that s
i is constrained to be small
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Note, if the trade volume Mi is small then in this situation it is optimal to exclude t
from the NT-based trade agreement. Similarly, we can assume an eﬀective constraint















ii[(i   1)!i + si] + ajM

i jg: (38)
Again, if trade volume jM
i j is small then it is optimal to exclude t from the NT-based
trade agreement. Therefore, from equations (37) and (38), we know that an eﬀective
constraint on s (jsj), Zi (Z
i ) is small if trade volume Mi (jM
i j) is suﬃciently small,
representing little trade volume to manipulate the terms of trade. This ﬁnding is also
identiﬁed by Horn et al (2010) in their externality framework.
5. Conclusion
In this manuscript we have incorporated political pressures and contracting costs
into the analysis of trade agreements. Like many previous studies in the political
economy literature (Hillary 1982, Snyder 1990, Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995a,
1995b), we view governments as agents that maximize their own interests in response
to political pressures rather than as benevolent agents that maximize aggregate social
12This ﬁnding is also identiﬁed by Horn et al (2010) using an externality framework.
































ij is the level of Johnson’s optimal tariﬀ and is referred to as monopoly
power eﬀect in Horn et al (2010). So once again we conclude the monopoly power eﬀect can be
decomposed into trade volume eﬀect and price sensitivity of import demand.
15welfare. What is distinctive in our political economy model is that it allows for not
only trade policies but also domestic production policies. As a result, our ﬁndings
regarding equilibrium policy choices in noncooperative and cooperation settings are
somewhat diﬀerent from previous ones.
When governments set their policies noncooperatively, our model shows that pro-
duction subsidies will emerge in industries that are politically organized at the expense
of those that are not. By including production subsidies as well as trade policies in our
model, we ﬁnd that production subsidies substitute for trade policies that would have
otherwise resulted from rent-seeking eﬀorts as in Grossman and Helpman (1995a).
Rates of protection are equivalent to Johnson’s optimal tariﬀ rates, which represent
international market power and are inversely aﬀected by the sizes of the elasticities
of export supply from foreign country. On the other hand, a costless trade agreement
would lead to equal rates of import tax in the net importing country and export
subsidy in net exporting country, a circumstance equivalent to free trade. We also
ﬁnd cooperative production subsidy rates are the same as those in a noncooperative
equilibrium suggesting that a trade agreement which constrains production subsidies
but not tariﬀs is not optimal.
Our model also yields predictions on the form of the optimal trade agreement
and how it depends on uncertainty and contracting costs. We identify circumstances
where it is optimal to leave domestic production subsidies to discretion and circum-
stances where it is optimal to leave consumption taxes to discretion in an NT-based
trade agreement. If domestic market conditions are such that production subsidies
or consumption taxes can not adequately substitute for tariﬀs, or if countries trade
little, it is in their best interest for both countries to exclude production subsidies or
consumption taxes from trade agreements.
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